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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
In this paper, we investigate the effect of loan market competition on euro area banks' retail pricing behaviour and focus, in particular, on its effect on the adjustment of retail bank interest rates to changes in market interest rates. Given the prominent role of the banking sector in the euro area's financial system, it is of significant importance for the ECB to monitor the degree of competitive behaviour in the euro area banking market. A more competitive banking market is expected to drive down bank loan rates, adding to the welfare of households and enterprises. In addition, in a more competitive market, changes in the ECB's main policy rates supposedly will be more effectively passed through to bank interest rates.
We apply a novel measure of bank competition called the Boone indicator, which is based on the notion that in a competitive market, more efficient companies are likely to gain market shares. Hence, the stronger the impact of efficiency on market shares is, the stronger is competition. Furthermore, by analyzing how this efficiency-market share relationship changes over time, this approach provides a measure which can be employed to assess how changes in competition affect the cost of borrowing for both households and enterprises, and how it affects the pass-through of policy rates into loan and deposit rates.
We test three hypotheses concerning the impact of loan market competition on euro area banks' loan and deposit rates. First, we examine the effect of loan market competition on the level on bank loan and deposit rates; second, using a panel error-correction model (ECM) we estimate the effect of loan market competition on the long-run equilibrium pass-through of bank interest rates to changes in corresponding market interest rates; third, we also test the impact of competition in the loan market on the immediate adjustment of bank interest rates to changes in market interest rates.
Our results suggest that stronger competition implies significantly lower interest rate spreads for most loan market products, as we expected. This result implies that bank interest rates are lower and that the pass-through of market rates is stronger, the heavier competition is. We find evidence of the latter in our error correction model of bank interest rates. Furthermore, when loan market competition is stronger, we observe larger bank spreads (that is, lower bank interest rates) on current account and time deposits. Lower time deposits rates are confirmed by the estimates of the ECM. Apparently, the competitive pressure in the loan market is heavier than in the deposit markets, so that banks under competition compensate for their reduction in loan market income by lowering their deposit rates.
Furthermore, in more competitive markets, bank interest rates appear to respond stronger and sometime faster to changes in market interest rates. These findings underline that bank competition has a substantial impact on the monetary policy transmission mechanism. More loan market competition enhances the strenghth and speed of transmission of monetary policy.
Introduction
This paper discusses the effects of bank competition on bank loan and deposit rate levels as well as on their responses to changes in market rates and, hence, on the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Given the prominent role of the banking sector in the euro area's financial system, it is of significant importance for the ECB to monitor the degree of competitive behaviour in the euro area banking market. A more competitive banking market is expected to drive down bank loan rates, adding to the welfare of households and enterprises. Further, in a more competitive market, changes in the ECB's main policy rates supposedly will be more effectively passed through to bank interest rates.
This study extends the existing empirical evidence, which suggests that the degree of bank competition may have a significant effect on both the level of bank rates and on the pass-through of market rates to bank interest rates. Understanding this pass-through mechanism is crucial for central banks. However, most studies that analyse the relationship between competition and banks' pricing behaviour apply a concentration index such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) as a measure of competition. We question the suitability of such indices as measures to capture competition. Where the traditional interpretation is that concentration erodes competition, concentration and competition may instead increase simultaneously when competition forces consolidation. For example, in a market where inefficient firms are taken over by efficient companies, competition may strengthen, while the market's concentration increases at the same time. In addition, the HHI suffers from a serious weakness in that it does not distinguish between small and large countries. In small countries, the concentration ratio is likely to be higher, precisely because the economy is small.
The main contribution of this paper is that it applies a new measure for competition, called the Boone indicator (see also Boone, 2001; Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn, 2008; Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2007) .
The basic notion underlying this indicator is that in a competitive market, more efficient companies are likely to gain market shares. Hence, the stronger the impact of efficiency on market shares is, the stronger is competition. Further, by analyzing how this efficiency-market share relationship changes over time, this approach provides a measure which can be employed to assess how changes in competition affect the cost of borrowing for both households and enterprises, and how it affects the pass-through of policy rates into loan and deposit rates.
Our study contributes also to the pass-through literature in the sense that it applies a newly-constructed data set on bank interest rates for eight euro area countries covering the January 1994 to March 2006 period. We include data for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 1 Further, we consider four types of loan products (mortgage loans, consumer loans and short and long-term loans to enterprises) and two types of deposits (time deposits and current account This paper uses interest rate data that cover a longer period and that are based on more harmonised principles than those used by previous pass-through studies for the euro area. We find that stronger competition implies significantly lower interest rate spreads for most loan market products, as we expected. Using an error correction model (ECM) approach to measure the effect of competition on the pass-through of market rates to bank interest rates, we likewise find that banks tend to price their loans more in accordance with the market in countries where competitive pressures are stronger.
Furthermore, where loan market competition is stronger, we observe larger spreads between bank and market interest rates (that is, lower bank interest rates) on current account and time deposits. Lower time deposit rates in countries with stronger bank competition are confirmed by the ECM estimates.
Apparently, the competitive pressure is heavier in the loan market than in the deposit markets, so that banks under competition compensate for their reduction in loan market income by lowering their deposit rates. Furthermore, in more competitive markets, bank interest rates appear to respond more strongly and sometime more rapidly to changes in market interest rates.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on both measuring competition and the bank interest rate pass-through. Section 3 describes the Boone indicator of competition and Section 4 the employed interest rate pass-through model of the error-correction type and the applied panel unit root and cointegration tests. Section 5 presents the various data sets used.
The results on the various tests and estimates of the spread model and the error correction model equations are shown in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 summarises and concludes.
1 For other euro area countries we had insufficient data to estimate the Boone indicator. 
Literature review

Measuring competition
Competition in the banking sector has been analysed by, amongst other methods, measuring market power (i.e. a reduction in competitive pressure) and efficiency. A well-known approach to measuring market power is suggested by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) , recently used by Bikker (2003) and Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) . They analyse bank behaviour on an aggregate level and estimate the average conjectural variation of banks. A strong conjectural variation implies that a bank is highly aware of its interdependence (via the demand equation) with other banks in terms of output and prices.
Under perfect competition, where output price equals marginal costs, the conjectural variation between banks should be zero, whereas a value of one would indicate monopoly. Panzar and Rosse (1987) propose an approach based on the so-called H-statistic which is the sum of the elasticities of the reduced-form revenues with respect to the input prices. In principle, this Hstatistic ranges from -to 1. An H-value equal to or smaller than zero indicates monopoly or perfect collusion, whereas a value between zero and one provides evidence of a range of oligopolistic or monopolistic types of competition. A value of one points to perfect competition. This approach has been applied to all (old) EU countries by Bikker and Haaf (2002) and to 101 countries by Bikker et al. (2006) .
A third indicator for market power is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which measures the degree of market concentration. This indicator is often used in the context of the 'Structure Conduct
Performance' (SCP) model (see e.g. Berger et al., 2004, and Bos, 2004) , which assumes that market structure affects banks' behaviour, which in turn determines their performance. 2 The idea is that banks with larger market shares may have more market power and use that. Moreover, a smaller number of banks make collusion more likely. To test the SCP-hypothesis, performance (profit) is explained by market structure, as measured by the HHI. Many articles test this model jointly with an alternative explanation of performance, namely the efficiency hypothesis, which attributes differences in performance (or profit) to differences in efficiency (e.g. Goldberg and Rai, 1996, and Smirlock, 1985) .
As has been mentioned above, the Boone indicator can be seen as an elaboration on the assumptions underlying this efficiency hypothesis (EH). This EH test is based on estimating an equation which explains profits from both market structure variables and measures of efficiency. The EH assumes that market structure variables do not contribute to profits once efficiency is considered as cause of profit.
As Bikker and Bos (2005) show, this EH test suffers from a multicollinearity problem if the EH holds.
Market power may also be related to profits, in the sense that extremely high profits may be indicative of a lack of competition. A traditional measure of profitability is the price-cost margin (PCM), which
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March 2008 is the output price minus marginal costs, divided by output price. The PCM is frequently used in the empirical industrial organization literature as an empirical approximation of the theoretical Lerner 3 and scope economies has in the past been investigated thoroughly. It is often assumed that, under strong competition, unused scale economies would be exploited and, consequently, reduced. 4 Hence, the existence of non-exhausted scale economies is an indication that the potential to reduce costs has not been exhausted and, therefore, can be seen as an indirect indicator of (imperfect) competition (Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn, 2008) . The existence of scale efficiency is also important as regards the potential entry of new firms, which is a major determinant of competition. Strong scale effects would place new firms in an unfavourable position.
A whole strand of literature is focused on X-efficiency, which reflects managerial ability to drive down production costs, controlled for output volumes and input price levels. X-efficiency of firm i is defined as the difference in cost levels between that firm and the best practice firms of similar size and input prices (Leibenstein, 1966) . Heavy competition is expected to force banks to drive down their Xinefficiency, so that the latter is often used as an indirect measure of competition. An overview of the empirical literature is presented in Bikker (2004) and Bikker and Bos (2005) .
Relationship between competition and monetary transmission
According to the seminal papers by Klein (1971) and Monti (1972) on banks' interest rate setting behaviour, banks can exert a degree of market pricing power in determining loan and deposit rates.
The Monti-Klein model demonstrates that interest rates on bank products with smaller demand elasticities are priced less competitively. Hence, both the levels of bank interest rates and their changes over time are expected to depend on the degree of competition. With respect to the level of bank interest rates, Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) show that an increase in banks' market power (i.e. a reduction in competitive pressure) results in higher net interest margins. 5 In addition, Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) explain the difference between bank retail interest rates and money market rates by bank's product-specific concentration indices. They find that in concentrated markets, retail lending rates are substantially higher, while deposits rates are lower.
2 Bikker and Bos (2005) , pages 22 and 23. 3 The Lerner index derives from the monopolist's profit maximisation condition as price minus marginal cost, divided by price. The monopolist maximises profits when the Lerner index is equal to the inverse price elasticity of market demand. Under perfect competition, the Lerner index is zero (market demand is infinitely elastic), in monopoly it approaches one for positive non-zero marginal cost. The Lerner index can be derived for intermediary cases as well. For a discussion see Church and Ware (2000) . 4 This interpretation would be different in a market numbering only a few banks. It would also be different in a market where many new entries incur unfavourable scale effects during the initial phase of their growth path. 5 Of course, competition is not the only factor determining the level of bank interest rates. Factors such as credit and interest risk, banks' degree of risk aversion, operating costs, and bank efficiency are also likely to impact on bank margins. See, for example, Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004 Regarding the effect of competition on the way banks adjust their lending and deposit rates, Hannan and Berger (1991) find that deposit rates are significantly more rigid in concentrated markets.
Especially in periods of rising monetary policy rates, banks in more consolidated markets tend not to raise their deposit rates, which may be indicative of (tacit) collusive behaviour among banks. In a cross-country analysis, both Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) and Borio and Fritz (1995) find a significant effect of constrained competition on the monetary transmission mechanism. Thus, lending rates tend to be stickier when banks operate in a less competitive environment, due to, inter alia, the existence of barriers to entry. This finding was confirmed in an Italian setting by Cottarelli et al. (1995) . Reflecting the existence of bank market power and collusive behaviour as well as potential switching costs for bank customers (or other factors affecting demand elasticities), the degree of price stickiness is likely to be asymmetric over the (monetary policy) interest rate cycle. 6 Against this background, Mojon (2001) tests for the impact of banking competition on the transmission process related to euro area bank lending rates, using an index of deregulation, constructed by Gual (1999) . He finds that higher competition tends to put pressure on banks to adjust lending rates quicker when money market rates are decreasing. Furthermore, higher competition tends to reduce the ability of banks to increase lending rates (although not significantly), when money market rates are moving upand vice versa for deposit rates. 7 Similar findings of asymmetric pass-through effects have been found by Scholnick (1996) , Heinemann and Schüler (2002) , Kleimeier (2002, 2004) and Gropp et al. (2007) . 8 Moreover, De Bondt (2005) argues that stronger competition from other banks and from capital markets has helped to speed up the euro area banks' interest rate adjustment's to changes in market rates.
A number of country-specific studies also provide evidence of sluggish pass-through from market rates into bank rates when competition is weak. For example, Heffernan (1997) finds that British banks' interest rate adjustment is compatible with imperfect competition whereas Weth (2002) , by using various proxies for bank market power, provides evidence of sluggish and asymmetric pass-through among German banks. De Graeve et al. (2004) estimate the determinants of the interest rate passthrough on Belgian banks and find that banks with more market power pursue a less competitive pricing policy. In a microeconomic analysis of Spanish banks, Lago-González and Salas-Fumás (2005) provide evidence that a mixture of price adjustment costs and bank market power causes price rigidity 6 See, for example, Neuwark and Sharpe (1992) and Mester and Saunders (1985) for empirical evidence of asymmetric interest rate pass-through effects among US banks. 7 In addition to bank competition, switching costs and other interest rate adjustment costs, bank rate rigidity may also be due to credit risk factors. For example, in a situation of credit rationing banks may decide to leave lending rates unchanged and to limit the supply of loans instead; see, for example, Winker (1999) . Banks may also choose to provide their borrowers with 'implicit interest rate insurance' by smoothing bank loan rates over the cycle; see Berger and Udell (1992) . Finally, sometimes banks give customers an interest rate option for a given period. These banks have to recoup the costs of their options which may reduce the speed of the interest rate pass through for outstanding clients.
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March 2008 and asymmetric pass-through. In a cross-country study, Kok Sørensen and Werner (2006) show that differences in the pass-through process across the euro area countries may to some extent be explained by national differences in bank competition. Finally, in another euro area based study, Gropp et al. (2007) provide evidence that the level of banking competition has a positive impact on the degree of bank interest rate pass-through.
The Boone indicator as measure of competition
Boone's indicator assumes that more efficient firms (that is, firms with lower marginal costs) will gain higher market shares or profits, and that this effect will be stronger the heavier competition in that market is. In order to support this intuitive market characteristic, Boone develops a broad set of theoretical models (see Boone, 2000 , Boone et al., 2004 , and CPB, 2000 . We use one of these models to explain the Boone indicator and to examine its properties compared to common measures such as the HHI and the PCM. Following Boone et al. (2004) , and replacing 'firms' by 'banks', we consider a banking industry where each bank i produces one product q i (or portfolio of banking products), which faces a demand curve of the form:
and has constant marginal costs mc i . This bank maximizes profits i = (p i -mc i ) q i by choosing the optimal output level q i . We assume that a > mc i and 0 < d b. The first-order condition for a CournotNash equilibrium can then be written as:
Where N banks produce positive output levels, we can solve the N first-order conditions (2), yielding:
We define profits i as variable profits excluding entry costs . Hence, a bank enters the banking industry if, and only if, i in equilibrium. Note that Equation (3) Equation (3) supports the use of the following model for market share, defined as s i = q i / j q j :
The market shares of banks with lower marginal costs are expected to increase, so that is negative.
The stronger competition is, the stronger this effect will be, and the larger, in absolute terms, this (negative) value of . We refer to as the Boone indicator. For empirical reasons, Equation (4) has been specified in log-linear terms in order to deal with heteroskedasticty. Moreover, this specification implies that is an elasticity, which facilitates interpretation, particularly across equations. 9 The choice of functional form is not essential, as the log-linear form is just an approximation of the pure linear form.
The theoretical model above can also be used to explain why widely-applied measures such as the HHI and the PCM fail as reliable competition indicators. The standard intuition of the HHI is based on a
Cournot model with homogenous banks, where a fall in entry barriers reduces the HHI. However, with banks that differ in efficiency, an increase in competition through a rise in d reallocates output to the more efficient banks that already had higher output levels. Hence, the increase in competition raises the HHI instead of lowering it. The effect of increased competition on the industry's PCM may also be perverse. Generally, heavier competition reduces the PCM of all banks. But since more efficient banks may have a higher PCM (skimming off the part of profits that stems from their efficiency lead), the increase of their market share may raise the industry's average PCM, contrary to common expectations.
We note that the Boone indicator model, like every other model, is a simplification of reality. First, efficient banks may choose to translate lower costs either into higher profits or into lower output prices in order to gain market share. Our approach assumes that the behaviour of banks is between these two extreme cases, so that banks generally pass on at least part of their efficiency gains to their clients.
More precisely, we assume that the banks' passing-on behaviour, which drives Equation (4), does not diverge too strongly across the banks. Second, our approach ignores differences in bank product quality and design, as well as the attractiveness of innovations. We assume that banks are forced over time to provide quality levels that are more or less similar. By the same token, we presume that banks have to follow the innovations of their peers. Hence, like many other model-based measures, the Boone indicator approach focuses on one important relationship affected by competition; thereby disregarding other aspects (see also Bikker and Bos, 2005) . Naturally, annual estimates of are more likely to be impaired by these distortions than the estimates covering the full sample period. Also, compared to direct measures of competition, the Boone indicator may have the disadvantage of being 9 The few existing empirical studies based on the Boone indicator all use a log linear relationship. See, for example, Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn (2008) .
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March 2008 an estimate and thus surrounded by a degree of uncertainty. Of course, other model-based measures, such as Panzar and Rosse's H-statistic, suffer from the same disadvantage. The latter shortcoming affects the annual estimates t more strongly than the full-sample period estimate .
As the Boone indicator may be time dependent, reflecting changes in competition over time, we estimate separately for every year (hence, t ). An absolute benchmark for the level of is not available. We only know that more negative betas reflect stronger competition. Comparing the indicator across countries or industries helps to interpret estimation results. For that reason, Boone and Weigand in CPB (2000) and Boone et al. (2004) apply the model to different manufacturing industries.
Since measurement errors -including unobserved country or industry specific factors -are less likely to vary over time than across industries, the time series interpretation of beta is probably more robust than the cross-sector one (that is, comparison of for various countries or industries at a specific moment in time). Therefore, Boone focuses mainly on the change in t over time within a given industry, rather than comparing between industries.
We improve on Boone's approach in two ways. First, we calculate marginal costs instead of approximating this variable with average costs. We are able to do so by estimating a translog cost function, which is more precise and more closely in line with theory. An important advantage is that these marginal costs allow focussing on segments of the market, such as the loan market, where no direct observations of individual cost items are available. Second, we use market share as our dependent variable instead of profits. The latter is, by definition, the product of market shares and profit margin. We have views with respect to the impact of efficiency on market share and its relation with competition, supported by the theoretical framework above, whereas we have no a priori knowledge about the effect of efficiency on the profit margin. Hence, a market share model will be more precise. An even more important advantage of market shares is that they are always positive, whereas the range of profits (or losses) includes negative values. A log-linear specification would exclude negative profits (losses) by definition, so that the estimation results would be distorted by sample bias, because inefficient, loss-making banks would be ignored.
In order to be able to calculate marginal costs, we estimate, for each country, a translog cost function (TCF) using individual bank observations. This function assumes that the technology of an individual bank can be described by a single one multiproduct production function. Under proper conditions, a dual cost function can be derived from such a production function, using output levels and factor prices as arguments. A TCF is a second-order Taylor expansion around the mean of a generic dual cost function with all variables appearing as logarithms. It is a flexible functional form that has proven to be an effective tool in explaining multiproduct bank services. Our TCF has different marginal costs for x ikt represent three groups of variables (k = 1,..., K). The first group consists of (K 1 ) bank output components, such as loans, securities and other services (proxied by other income). The second group consists of (K 2 ) input prices, such as wage rates, deposit rates (as price of funding) and the price of other expenses (proxied as the ratio of other expenses to fixed assets). The third group consists of (K-
control variables (also called 'netputs'), e.g. the equity ratio. In line with Berger and Mester (1997) , the equity ratio corrects for differences in loan portfolio risk across banks. The coefficients h , jh and jkh , all vary with h, the bank type. The parameters t are the coefficients of the time dummies and v it is the error term.
Two standard properties of cost functions are linear homogeneity in the input prices and costexhaustion (see e.g. Beattie and Taylor, 1985, and Jorgenson, 1986) . They impose the following restrictions on the parameters, assuming -without loss of generality -that the indices j and k of the two sum terms in Equation (5) are equal to 1, 2 or 3, respectively, for wages, funding rates and prices of other expenses:
The first restriction stems from cost exhaustion, reflecting the fact that the sum of cost shares is equal to unity. In other words, the value of the three inputs is equal to total costs. Linear homogeneity in the input prices requires that the three linear input price elasticities ( i ) add up to 1, whereas the squared and cross terms of all explanatory variables ( i,j ) add up to zero. Again without loss of generality, we also apply symmetry restrictions j,k = k,j for j, k = 1, .., K. 10 As Equation (5) expresses that we assume different cost functions for each type of banks, the restrictions (6) likewise apply to each type of bank.
The marginal costs of output category j = l (of loans) for bank i of category h in year t, mc ilt h are defined as:
March 2008 The term ln c it h / ln x ilt is the first derivative of Equation (5) 
The interest rate pass-through model
Our analysis of the pass-through of market rates to bank interest rates takes into account that economic variables may be non-stationary. 11 The relationship between non-stationary but cointegrated variables should preferably be based on an error-correction model (ECM), which allows disentangling the longrun co-movement of the variables from the short-run adjustment towards the equilibrium. Accordingly, most of the pass-through studies conducted in recent years apply an ECM, as it allows testing for both the long-run equilibrium pass-through of bank rates to changes in market rates and the speed of adjustment towards the equilibrium. 12 Using a panel-econometric approach, we test for the impact of banking competition (measured by the Boone indicator) on the long-run bank interest rate passthrough.
Estimation of the long-run relationship
If bank interest rates and their corresponding market rates are cointegrated, we may analyse their longrun relationship in an error-correction framework. Hereby, we test for the three hypotheses by estimating the following two equations for each of the six considered interest rates:
(9.b) Equation (9.a) reflects the long-run equilibrium pass-through, while Equation (9.b) presents the shortterm adjustments of bank interest rates to their long-run equilibrium. BR i,t and MR i,t are the bank 11 In order to avoid spurious results, see Granger and Newbold (1974) . 12 See, for example, Mojon (2001 ), De Bondt (2002 , 2005 , Sander and Kleimeier (2004) , and Kok Sørensen and Werner (2006) . 13 Namely, four types of loan products (mortgage loans, consumer loans and short and long-term loans to enterprises) and two types of deposits (time deposits and current account deposits).
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interest rate and the corresponding market rate, respectively, in country i (for i = 1,…, N) at time t (for t = 1,…, T), observed at a quarterly basis. BI i,t is the Boone indicator of country i at time t. For convenience's sake, the Boone indicator is redefined in positive terms, so that an increase in the Boone indicator reflects stronger competition (hence BI = -). In all estimations, we include the market interest rates for the different countries separately ( i MR i,t and i MR i,t , respectively, in the long and short run), in order to observe country-specific effects, as well as multiplied by the Boone indicator ( BI i,t MR i,t and BI i, t MR i,t , respectively, in the long and short run), in order to capture the (overall) impact of competition on the pass-through. Furthermore, in the long-run model we account for country effects, by using country dummies (D i ). The short-run model includes the error-correction term ( i u i,t-1 ), the effects of competition on short-term adjustments in market rates ( BI i,t MR i,t ) for all countries simultaneously and the change in the market interest rate for each country separately
In Equations (9.a) and (9.b), we estimate European-wide (or panel) parameters for the various competition effects ( , and ), because the Boone indicator varies insufficiently over time to estimate reliable country-specific effects. The other parameters ( i , i and i ) remain country-specific, unless restrictions that these parameters are equal across all countries considered would be accepted by a Wald test.
The three hypotheses to be tested are:
I)
Are loan interest rates lower, and are deposit interest rates higher, in more competitive loan markets than in less competitive loan markets? H 0 : + MR i,t < 0 and As we measure competition on the loan market, the competition effects on the deposit-rate passthrough may be less reliable. Loan market competition might have a positive impact on deposit markets also, implying 1 + 1 MR i,t > 0. Alternatively, banks may try to compensate for strong loan market competition by exploiting their market power in the deposit market, in which case
14 Note that competition causes a downwards shift to the level of bank interest rates (that is, 1 < 0) as well as a change in the relationship between market rates and bank rates (expressed by 1 MR i,t ).
ECB Working Paper Series No 885
Unit root and panel cointegration tests
Unit root tests
As a first preparatory step, we investigate the unit root properties of the variables. 15 We apply two types of tests based on two different null hypotheses. The Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) 
Cointegration tests
In a second preliminary step, we test for cointegration using panel cointegration tests by Pedroni (1999 Pedroni ( , 2004 which are based on the following regression models:
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The long-run coefficients i,j may be different across the euro area countries. We use the group mean panel version of the Pedroni test. The null hypothesis of this test assumes a unit root in the residuals of the cointegration regression, which implies absence of cointegration. The alternative hypothesis assumes a root less than one, but allows for different roots in different countries. 16 We use three different types of test statistics: an ADF type which is similar to the ADF statistic used in univariate unit-root tests, a nonparametric Phillips-Perron (PP) version, and a version which is based directly on the autoregressive coefficient ( -test).
The Data
The Boone indicator
This paper uses the Bankscope database of banks from eight euro area countries during 1992-2004, namely Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Our choice of countries was limited by the availability of (usable) data. For countries such as Finland, Greece and
Ireland not enough data are available. Luxembourg is excluded from our sample because its figures presumably do not reflect local market conditions due to the high international profile of its banks. We focus on commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks and mortgage banks, ignoring the 25% more specialized institutions such as investment banks, securities firms, long-term credit banks and specialized governmental credit institutions. An exception is made for Germany in order to achieve a more adequate coverage of the national banking systems: specialized German governmental credit institutions, comprising mainly the major Landesbanken, are included. In addition to certain public finance duties, the Landesbanken also offer banking activities in competition with private sector banks, and thus should be included to ensure adequate cover of the competitive environment in the German banking system (see Hackethal, 2004) . The appendix provides a detailed description of the data; see also Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) . 1999) . For a more detailed description and application to a similar set of data, see also Kok Sørensen and Werner (2006) . 16 In the panel versions of the tests the alternative hypothesis assumes a root which is less than one but is identical between the countries. Hence, the group mean versions allow for stronger heterogeneity. As a result, we focus on the test's group mean version. 17 The Boone indicator results in this paper may seem different from those in Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) . However, both working papers use identical estimates of the Boone indicator. The estimates in the appendix of the present paper are exactly equal to the estimates in Table 5 .4 in Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) . However, the presentation of the results differs in two respects from Table 5 .3 in Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) . First, in this paper we present three additional euro-area countries, namely Austria, Belgium and Portugal. Second, in Table  5 .3 of Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) we compare the average Boone indicator across the European countries by estimating a single parameter for each country over the entire sample period. In this way, we obtain a weighted average of the Boone indicator over the entire period instead of an unweighted average of the annually (time dependent) estimates as in Eurosystem. 19 The MIR statistics consist of more detailed breakdowns than the NRIR statistics, particularly with respect to the size of loans and the rate fixation periods. In order to link the two sets of statistics, the MIR series have been aggregated (using new business volumes as weights) to the broader product categories of the NRIR statistics, which include rates on mortgage loans, rates on consumer loans, rates on short-term loans to non-financial corporations ( 1 year), rates on long-term loans to non-financial corporations (>1 year), rates on current account deposits and rates on time deposits. The data period covers 147 monthly observations ranging from January 1994 to March 2006. We select market rates which correspond to these bank interest rates in terms of the rate fixation period. Hence, a three-month money market rate is selected to correspond with bank rates that are either floating or fixed for short periods (below one year), while longer-term government bond yields are selected for long-term fixed bank rates. 20 Table 5 .2 presents the data availability of bank interest rates in each country and for each product category together with the corresponding market rates. Note that there is strong variation in interest rate fixation periods across both products and countries. For instance, in many of the considered euro area countries the predominant fixation period for mortgages is rather short, proxied by three months. For Germany and France, however, the typical fixation period on consumer loans is quite long, approximated here by five years. mortgage rates and consumer lending rates were highest (lowest) in Portugal (Austria). Regarding short-term loans to enterprises rates were on average highest (lowest) in Portugal (Germany), whereas regarding long-term loans to enterprises rates were highest (lowest) in Italy (Belgium). On the deposit side, current account deposit rates were lowest (highest) in Austria (Italy), while time deposit rates were lowest (highest) in Italy (Germany). Regarding developments over time, it may be noted that the variation of bank interest rates was highest in the Mediterranean countries reflecting the particular strong decline in the overall level of interest rates in those countries. Table 5 .4 details the market interest rates for the considered countries. We find that Italy has, on average, the highest three-month money market rate and the Netherlands the lowest. The same picture arises for the 5-year government bond yield. The minima for the three-month money market rates and the two government bond yields with, respectively, a 5 and 10 year fixation period are very similar across all countries: these minima where reached after the introduction of the euro in 1999. Table 5 .5 presents the spreads between the various bank and market rates. We present the spreads on deposits as a negative number as the market interest rates are higher than the bank lending rates on these products. On average, the spreads are narrow ranging from 0.5% to 2.0%, with the notable exception of consumer loans where bank interest rates often include very high risk premiums. 
Empirical results
Estimates of the Boone indicator for the loan markets in the euro area countries are presented in the appendix. This approach is similar to the procedure applied in Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) . We obtain annual estimates of the Boone indicator. As the regressions in this section are based on monthly data, we calculate 'smoothed' Boone indicator values using moving averages over six months. Table 6 .1 reports the panel unit root tests for the bank and market interest rate series of the considered eight euro area countries simultaneously. The outcomes indicate non-stationarity at the 5% significance level for all the bank and market interest rate series used. The IPS test on the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level for either the bank rates or the market rates, suggesting non-stationary interest rates. While the IPS test indicates stationarity of the Boone indicator, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level
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March 2008 for the product of the Boone indicator and the market rates for three of the six categories, namely mortgage loans, consumer loans and time deposits. However, the Hadri-test on the null hypothesis of stationarity is clearly rejected in all cases. Furthermore, we apply the panel unit root tests for the first differences in interest rates to test on second order non-stationarity. The results reject I(2) and, hence, support the conclusion that the interest rate series are integrated of order 1, so that I(1) holds. Given these findings, we proceed to test on cointegration between bank interest rates and the corresponding market rates. Table 6 .2 shows the results for Pedroni's three panel cointegration tests as applied to the long-run models of the six bank rates. 21 For bank interest rates on consumer loans and current account deposits, the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected. Apparently, therefore, the adjustment of interest rates on consumer loans and current account deposits to changes in market rates is so sluggish that even a long-run relationship cannot be detected in our sample. 22 Consequently, the results of the error-correction model on consumer loans and current account deposits, presented in Section 6.2 below, have to be interpreted with caution. For the other four long-run bank rate models, the null hypothesis of no cointegration has been rejected (for two of the three tests), indicating a long-run equilibrium relationship between bank rates, market rates and the Boone indicator. 
Competition and the bank interest-rate pass-through
As a first investigation into the impact of competition on the bank interest rate pass-through, we analyse the effect of competition on the various spreads between bank and market interest rates (see Table 6 .3). The main finding is that competition tends to keep bank loan rates more closely in line with the corresponding market rates (implying that they are lower). Moreover, the results in Table 6 .3 show that competition significantly diminishes the bank rate spreads for three out of four loan products, namely for mortgages, consumer loans and short-term loans to enterprises. No significant effect is found for long-term loans to enterprises. The Boone indicator's elasticities of the first three loan products indicate that mortgage loans are least affected by competition while short-term loans to enterprises are influenced most strongly. Two and three asterisks indicate a level of confidence of 95% and 99%, respectively. 1) The z-value indicates whether the parameter significantly differs from 0 under the normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation one.
2) Chisquared distributed Wald tests on H 0 'all country dummy coefficients are zero' and 'all montly time dummy coefficients are zero', respectively. The null hypotheses are rejected for all loan and deposit types.
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March 2008 For the two deposit categories, competition in the loan market seems to increase the (negative) spread between bank and market rates. Hence, deposit rates become lower where there is fierce competition in the loan market. This could reflect that the competitive pressure is heavier in the loan market than in the deposit markets, so that banks under competitive pressure compensate for their decline in loan market income by lowering their deposit rates. Table 6 .4 presents the estimated long-run relationship of the error-correction model (ECM) described in Section 4.1 (Equation (9.a)), in order to test the three hypotheses mentioned in that section. This model explains bank interest rates from the Boone indicator and the market interest rates. We use Newey-West's kernel-based heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) variance estimations to correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, where the bandwidth has been set on two periods. We observe that the impact of market rates on bank interest rates is highly significant for all six interest rates considered and in all eight euro area countries. Moreover, in line with the existing literature, we find that the country-specific long-run pass-through coefficients ( i ) differ considerably across product categories (and across countries) for both the long and short term. The adjustment of bank interest rates to changes in market rates is highest for mortgage loans, loans to enterprises and time deposits.
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The first hypothesis is: are loan interest rates lower, and are deposit interest rates higher, in more competitive loan markets than in less competitive loan markets? Contrary to the estimations of the spreads presented above, the ECM long-run equation does not assume full pass-through of market rates within one month. Table 6 .4 shows that the effect of the interaction terms with the Boone indicator of competition and the market rate is (slightly) positive for all four considered loan products. 24 But the Chi-squared distributed Wald tests on H 0 : + MR i,t = 0 also shows that the combined effects of + MR i,t on bank rates are not significant. This outcome does not confirm our earlier finding of significantly lower loan market spreads under competition. Apparently, the simple spread model is a more succesful tool to observe the competition effect than the more complicated ECM.
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The second hypothesis is: do bank interest rates in more competitive markets show stronger long-run responses to the corresponding market rates compared to less competitive markets? Our results suggest that all four bank loan rates do indeed respond significantly more strongly to market rates when competition is high, as reflected by the significant positive coefficient of the product terms of indicator and market rates for all loan categories. We find that competition in the loan market contributes also to a more complete pass-through of interest rates on current accounts. 26 All in all, we observe that, generally, competition does make for stronger long-run bank rate responses to corresponding market rates. The third hypothesis is: do more competitive markets adjust faster in the short run to changes in market interest rates than in less competitive markets? To test this hypothesis, we estimate Equation (9.b). The results in Table 6 .5 indicate that the immediate responses of banks' interest rates on loans to changes in market rates tend indeed to be higher in more competitive markets (see the coefficient of 26 As mentioned in Section 4, the estimated long-run relationship between interest rates on consumer loans and current account deposits and corresponding market rates may be spurious owing to the lack of a statistically significant cointegration relationship. the product terms). 27 However, the effect is not statistically significant. All in all, we find only limited evidence to support the third hypothesis.
Conclusion
This paper analyses the effects of loan market competition on bank interest rates on loans and deposits, measuring competition by a new approach, called the Boone indicator. Our results show that, in the euro area countries, bank interest rate spreads on mortgage loans, consumer loans and short-term loans to enterprises are significantly lower in more competitive markets. This result implies that bank loan rates tend to be lower under heavier competition, thus improving social welfare. Banks compensate for stronger loan market competition by lowering their deposit rates. Furthermore, evidence is found for all four loan categories that, in the long run, bank loan rates are closer in line with market rates where competition is higher. These results show that stronger loan market competition reduces bank loan rates while changes in market rates are transmitted more rapidly to bank rates. These findings underline that bank competition may have a substantial impact on the monetary policy transmission mechanism. 27 We have tested on one single EU-wide parameter for market interest rates and for one single EU-wide parameter for residuals in the short-run ECM model. The null hypotheses of a single EU-wide parameter were rejected for most loan and deposit categories in favour of separate country-specific parameters. 
Estimation results for marginal costs
We estimate a translog cost function for each separate country and take the first derivative of loans to derive the marginal costs of lending, see Equations (5) and (8) (Hayashi, 2000) . The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid as such, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic is chi-squared with the number of degrees of freedom equal to the number of overidentification restrictions. A rejection would cast doubt on the validity of the instruments.
Furthermore, the Anderson canonical correlation likelihood ratio is used to test for the relevance of excluded instrument variables (Hayashi, 2000) . The null hypothesis of this test is that the matrix of reduced form coefficients has rank K-1, where K is the number of regressors, meaning that the equation is underidentified. Under the null hypothesis of underidentification, the statistic is chi-squared distributed with L-K+1 degrees of freedom, where L is the number of instruments (whether included in the equation or excluded). This statistic provides a measure of instrument relevance, and rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the model is identified. We use kernel-based heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) variance estimations. The bandwidth in the estimation is set at two periods and the Newey-West kernel is applied. Where the instruments are overidentified, 2SLS is used instead of GMM. For this 2SLS estimator, Sargan's statistic is used instead of the Hansen J-test.
Over the sample period, the Boone indicator for Belgium, Germany, and Italy are highly significant, exept for one or two years, suggesting stronger loan market competition then elsewhere in the euro area. 31 The Dutch and Spanish loan markets take up an intermediate position with significant Boone indicators for at least a number of years. For France, the degree of competition declined over the years, where the reverse development is observed for Austra and Portugal. If, for each country, we had estimated only one beta for the full-sample period instead of annual ones (that is, t = for all t), we would have obtained significant values for all countries (except Portugal), reflecting a certain degree of competion in the whole area (see Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2007) . 
